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Comments on The Morality of Freedom
Joseph Raz1
Anyone older than forty must be aware how odd it feels to imagine, perhaps
aided by contemporary home movies, what one was like thirty years before.
The more important were those past days for one’s future the odder it is to
think of them now. One comes to them with the hindsight of their
consequences, whereas one lived through them minded of the reality that they
changed, and which now resists memory.
Not being a reader of my own writings, revisiting a thirty-year-old book of
mine brings similar feelings. I would not have ventured to re-encounter my
book but for the stimulation of and the lessons I learnt from the comments
published in this volume, and from discussions in the conference in which they
were first presented. As often, I admire the care with which the contributors
read the book, and their ability to express some of its ideas better than I
managed. Their observations and criticism taught me more than will be evident
from my brief reflections that follow. This is largely because I thought it best
not to enter into detailed discussion of their contributions, but to offer a
reflection about the book which is largely inspired by them, and engages with
their observations, often by implication, sometimes directly.
I do not wish to defend the book; not because it is indefensible nor because it
needs no defence. It was launched all that time ago to fare on its own. I was
not then, and am certainly not now, best qualified to explain and defend its
theses. If there is some good in it, that is because its ideas may spark others,
inviting development and interpretation in various, possibly diverging,
Professor, Columbia Law School, New York, and research professor, King’s College
London. Email address: jr159@columbia.edu
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directions. Defending it, especially if successful, may even be counterproductive, discouraging people from developing their ideas on its foundations.
Needless to say the welcome possibility that the book (as I will refer to The
Morality of Freedom) may trigger comments and interpretations that modify
and contextualise its content indicates that it was never thought to be the final
word on anything. Put aside the obvious possibility that it may stimulate people
to make significant contributions simply by becoming aware of mistakes made
in it. Generally, we do not hope to enrich understanding by making mistakes
that will be corrected. But we may and should aim to improve understanding
by advancing sensible ideas that can be improved upon. There are at least two
ways in which a work can be developed and improved, even by later work by
its author, without imputing to it mistakes. Both result from the fact that
whatever we say is said in a context. First, a book is intended to solve some
problems, but there are others that were not, sometimes could not be in the
mind of the writer, and are not solved by what he wrote. Their solution may
not only be consistent with the views of the book. It may cohere with its
general approach. Second, the language used in advancing the book’s theses
was chosen in light of sensible (I am assuming) expectations about how it is
likely to be understood by the probable audience, but that same language may
be misunderstood by others, who come to the text from a different
background and with different preoccupations. In connecting the book’s theses
to wider concerns, showing how it fits in within a broader outlook, one can
build on it, even in far reaching ways, without contradicting it.
In that way, people may find the book’s relation to various cultural and other
phenomena interesting, even while aware that the author was not thinking
about them. They may relate the book to such phenomena, pointing out its
limitations, or its potential to shed light on matters not directly discussed in it.
Avishai Margalit’s discussion of personal autonomy does, among other things,

2
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2857419

just that. It relates the book, or an aspect of it, to other cultural traditions
about autonomy, about manipulation, about the meaning one may find in one’s
life. The first way mentioned above in which the book is not meant to be the
final word is perhaps best illustrated by Daniel Viehoff’s comment. The views
about authority the book advances were prompted by a puzzle: how can one
person’s or institution’s words intended to bind people actually bind those
people, especially other people? There are many other questions to ask about
authority, many that I did not deal with. Some of them have been presented as
objections to the account of authority I give, whereas in fact they do no more
than underline the point I make, namely that the account is very abstract and
further moral principles have to be invoked to show how it applies in more
specific political contexts. Others are supposed to be counter-examples, that is
cases where on my account there is or there is no authority whereas the
objectors think otherwise. Such objections may reflect a difference of opinion
not about the nature of authority, but about other matters, e.g. about the
duties that people have when they live in societies of one character or
another. According to the Service Account (as I call my account of authority)
difference of opinions about people’s moral duties often generates difference
of opinions about the conditions under which institutions have legitimate
authority. The issue that Viehoff addresses results from a different kind of
objection, one that ignores the ordinary meaning of the language in which the
Service Account is couched and focusses exclusively on those parts of it that
can be presented in a more formulaic way, i.e. the parts of it that I emphasised,
given the difficulty that I aimed to overcome: how one agent’s say-so can bind
another. He shows how these objections disappear once one considers other
elements implicit in the account, and in doing so he enriches the Service
Account and makes it more complete.
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What motivated the book? What would it be good to think were among its
motivating impulses? An important motivation, which is attested right at the
beginning, was to avoid adherence to a party; to deflate the importance of any
resemblance to a party or a school. Far too many philosophical publications
are concerned not with which ideas are sound, or what arguments are good,
but whether this or that author or this or that publication belongs or does not
belong with some school of thought. To mention but one example: much
writing in political philosophy is preoccupied with establishing the credentials,
or lack thereof, of a writer as a liberal, or a political liberal. I secretly enjoyed
reactions to the book that condemned it for not being true to liberalism.
Were they condemning liberalism as a mistaken political theory (exposed as
such by the book)? No, the comment appeared to be made by people for
whom party credentials were what mattered most.
I do not believe that liberalism is (or contains) a political theory or family of
theories united by shared core doctrines. Theories commonly identified as
liberal diverge on many central issues, and resemble non-liberal theories (that
is ones that are not commonly classified as liberal) on other issues. Liberalism
is best understood as a historical phenomenon identified by lines of historical
development, by cross references that express the appeal that some writers
had for others, and often by a common temperament.
I wish I had been equally successful in avoiding falling into someone else’s
agenda, which one may innocently do by starting to use – in order not to be a
pedant, to facilitate communication, etc. – a term introduced by another
writer. By using that term one may be caught up for ever in disputes framed by
the presuppositions of that other writer and those interested in his work, and
which one finds alien to one’s own way of conceiving the underlying issues. All
of this happened to me because I used the term ‘perfectionism’. I even earned
an unsought after position, a location on a Rawlsian inspired map of the world,
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having become a Perfectionist Liberal. This brought some of the benefits of
moderate fame: those inclined to study political doctrines guided by the
Rawlsian map had now to footnote my own spot on that map. In fact, there is
no such spot: there is no sensible content to the idea of Perfectionist
Liberalism, other than that the term can be used to indicate that the writer or
the work does not support Rawls’ own version of the justification of political
doctrines that should govern life in societies like ours. My views do indeed
differ from his in this respect, but the intimation of some positive doctrines
carried by ‘perfectionism’ are chimerical.
There is another feature of some contemporary political writing, possibly
exemplified most clearly in some writings in the liberal tradition, that I was
determined to avoid. It can be called the Hubris of the Moderns – the belief
that some commendable features of some contemporary political
arrangements are necessary for any political society to be morally decent, to
conform to minimal standards of moral acceptability. My thought was that
what matters in political arrangements is the degree to which they enable and
facilitate having a fulfilling, rewarding life and avoid excluding people from their
protection and benefits, as well as avoid repression of basic human needs. One
of the main theses argued for in the book is that the availability of options
whose embrace can lead to or constitutes part of a successful life, is provided
by the socially defined opportunities and forms of life available in the societies
in which we live, and in socially permitted access to them. If this is so then if
people can have a successful life in some societies, that is due to those
societies’ social organisation (and only partly due to attempts to fight and
change it). I also think that whatever the imperfections of their societies, many
people who have lived throughout human history were able to have rewarding
lives, and therefore that whatever the imperfections of their societies quite a
few of them met at least minimal conditions of permissibility. I also believe that
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most societies, including liberal democracies, today have repressive features
and exclude various groups from participation in valuable options to a degree
that makes them seriously morally defective. Hence my, admittedly
controversial, views about the Hubris of the Moderns, which are manifested in
many aspects of the book, and very clearly in its contention that personal
autonomy, which is so vital for the possibility of rewarding life in many
societies today, was not always so important. More fundamentally, the
arguments for value pluralism, for a plurality of ways in which one may have a
rewarding life, was fundamental in preparing the way to the rejection of the
Hubris of the Moderns.
The sentiments and ambitions to which I here confess are both common and
controversial among writers on political philosophy, or at least the way I tried
to pursue them is. For example, it seemed clear that in public political rhetoric
many terms are validly and effectively used not because of their cognitive
content, not because they invoke doctrines of political action or organisation,
but because of their emotional force, and their invocation of historical events,
aspirations, or because they signal identification with broad political
movements that one trusts or distrusts, etc. Rhetorical discourse is particularly
helpful when one of the functions of the discourse is to distinguish friend from
foe, to reassure, to encourage one to stand with one’s friends and so on. In
philosophical discussions there is a case for limiting the role of rhetorical
discourse and for signalling locations of its occurrence relatively clearly, in
order to isolate it from much of the argumentation for or against various
views. This helps to avoid prettifying talk and myth-making.
The appeal to an ideal of Equality is a prime case in point. I tried to show how
so far as the concept of equality is concerned it can be invoked in support of
various principles of entitlement, indeed in connection with various principles
that have some truth in them, that is principles that state pro tanto reasons,
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that are true when applied to some contexts. In fact, ‘equality’ is used in
connection with some principles but not at all with others. For its use is
determined by historical and rhetorical reasons. I bolstered that point by
explaining the structure of principles of entitlement that indicate concern for
equality that is not merely rhetorical. It was my view that sound principles of
this latter kind are not among the more fundamental moral or political
principles. This is of course a non-existence claim: There are no sound
fundamental principles of equality. Such claims are hard to prove, and I
certainly did not, and did not claim to have proved it. I attempted to make it
plausible by explaining how some unsound principles are plausible only if
supplemented by principles of (non-rhetorical) equality. Once one realises that
those principles are not sound the inclination to endorse those principles of
equality is undermined.2 They are no longer required: their work, I wrote, is
done without them and they are mere decorations. Michael Otsuka is right to
point out that that last point is false. One way in which it is false is that there
are circumstances in which non-rhetorical egalitarian principles make a
difference even within ethical outlooks that avoid those unsound theories.
Some of the correct points made by Otsuka in this regard do not undermine
my argument. Because it is not meant to be a proof of anything, it need not
cover all logical possibilities. It has to apply only to conditions likely in our
circumstances, for the aim is to persuade people out of belief in fundamental
non-rhetorical equality principles by showing that the ethical beliefs they hold
are vindicated by sound moral principles that do not include principles of nonrhetorical equality. But other of his points do undercut my case. For example,
a particularly regrettable oversight of mine was the failure to see that even if
Steiner’s argument in favour of the value of equality mentioned by Sharon is, in a way, an
example: I do not wish to allow that his argument from the value of negative liberty to the value of
equality in its distribution is valid. However, his misconception of the value of liberty , which
undermines his argument about the value of negative liberty, makes its implications for equality
irrelevant.
2
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when sound principles are completely realised they (trivially) achieve equality
(what I call by-product equality) it does not follow that the degree of advancing
towards their full realisation is matched by the degree of advance towards
equality. Therefore, those who believe in non-rhetorical equality may differ
from those who don’t about the way to progress closer to complete
realisation of those principles. The second way in which my claim was false, or
at least exaggerated, is that, as Otsuka remarks, my arguments cannot hope to
account for all ethical beliefs people have, especially not for their beliefs about
the desirability of equality. This is consistent with the aim of the arguments: in
the conditions of our life whatever equality people believe in is unlikely to be
achieved in practice. Practical ethical debates are usually about the desirability
of reducing inequalities of certain kinds (and about what kinds of inequalities
matter). My argument in the book was that reducing these inequalities is, for
the most part, justified without invoking equality. That leaves unresolved
disagreement about what is the ideal situation. On this I was hoping to
convince some people to change their views. In this regard both Otsuka and
Asaf Sharon have a point when they say that I beg the question against nonrhetorical egalitarians. The point is not that I beg the question against them. It
is that I do not offer an argument for the non-existence of sound ethical
outlooks in which non-rhetorical egalitarian principles are fundamental. I rely
on good sense in identifying some of the considerations that can make nonrhetorical egalitarian principles attractive, and showing that they do not lead to
fundamental egalitarian principles. I think that these observations were basically
sound, though I would have expressed them differently had I written the book
today. That I failed to convince many, including Sharon 3 and Otsuka, does not
I suspect that Sharon’s views and mine share much, especially because he looks for principles
of more limited scope among which he finds sound principles of equality. Once we locate equality in
specific contingent contexts we encounter many sound concerns for equality of treatment and many
for curtailing the acceptable range of inequality in distribution, based on both consequentialist and
non-consequentialist considerations.
3
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show otherwise. Attempts at persuasion of my kind cannot convince everyone.
Possibly they are the best we can do when faced with the suspicion that a
putative value is in fact illusory, that whatever good is claimed for it is no good
or is due to some other value. But even if this is the best form of argument it
requires different examples, different arguments for different people, given the
variety of their other beliefs and temperaments.4
Arudra Burra mentions that when the book offers an account of concepts the
accounts are theory driven, and are not meant to be accounts of the meaning
of the term(s) we use to express the concept. I was rather opaque about the
way such ‘conceptual accounts’ are justified, and therefore rather vague about
what sort of claims they make. While this is not the place for an extensive
discussion of the matter I will essay a few observations that may clarify matters
somewhat, and that are relevant, in various ways, when assessing the
comments contributed here by Burra, Margalit, Sharon and Japa Pallikkathayil.
The meaning of a word is its contribution to the content of an utterance in
which it features, when it is used correctly. Rules of meaning, in other words,
spell out how to use the words whose meaning they specify in order to make
utterances with a certain content (and depending on one’s semantic theory:
force, resonance, etc.). The words used to express concepts whose
clarification is of philosophical interest are also used in many other ways. So
that explanations of their meanings explain too much (their contribution in
other contexts) and too little (they are unlikely to help with the philosophical
elucidation of the concepts even when dealing with the use of the words
expressing them in a philosophically relevant context).

One claim by Otsuka surprised me. I cannot see why he thinks that it is a criticism of my
views that they do not enable one to distinguish between the one and two child cases in the way
that he does. My views may entail something about the two child case, and they entail nothing
regarding the single child case, and thus they enable one to reach different conclusions about the
two cases. Naturally one would not reach them the way that a non-rhetorical egalitarian like Otsuka
does.
4
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So what am I, and others, trying to do? We identify a range of phenomena that
have some puzzling aspects, and offer explanations that dissolve the puzzles. As
already mentioned, one of my puzzles was how can people create duties, or
more broadly, normative reasons by expressing an intention to do so (there
are of course conflicting accounts of the puzzling phenomena, e.g., some
people think that these reasons are generated by intending to generate them.
So there is also an argument about that issue, but leave that on one side here).
The phenomena affected by this puzzle divide into at least two classes,
depending whether the reasons apply to their creators, as in decisions or
promises, or to others. I have argued that there are two different explanations
of the puzzle in these two cases, though both share some formal features.
Given that a central case of so generating reasons for others is that of
authorities, the explanation of that part of the puzzle became an account of
authorities (through being an account of legitimate authorities).
However, not all authorities are of this kind, or if you like, the word ‘authority’
applies to various other phenomena as well. Given that those other
phenomena do not raise the same puzzle, and given that the ability to generate
reasons in this way appears to play an important role in human life, it seemed
sensible to focus on that type of authority. Not to denigrate the others, but
simply because there is something of importance to say about this kind of
authority.
That is not the end of the story. But I will add only one point: we employ, in
our reflections, plans and intentions, many concepts derived from different
religious, philosophical and other cultural traditions. I share with many who
write on these topics the dual ambition of, first, focussing on some of those
concepts that are, taken together, powerful enough to enable rich reflection,
planning etc. while avoiding others, primarily because they appear to be mired
beyond redemption in false ideas, or ethically objectionable outlooks. Second,
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to make clear their interrelations, to make explicit the inferential relations
between them.
These remarks bear on the character of arguments for and against various
normative theses. They indicate, for example, that arguments from counterexamples require much more than producing a counter-example (or if a
counter-example is understood as a successful counter-example then they
require more than producing a putative counter-example). A claim that (the
concept) C is defined by conditions i to n, may be true even if there are
statements, properly made with the use of (the word) ‘c’, that show that it is
proper to use ‘c’ even when those conditions are not met. Such counterexamples may damage claims about the meaning of ‘c’, but my discussion (like
many others in philosophy) is not about the meaning of any word, and need
not be affected by the existence of the counter-example unless it shows a use
of ‘c’ in a context relevant to the thesis about C. Furthermore, it is no simple
matter to judge whether the counter-example is relevant. To review the
situation: There is a wide range of phenomena that ‘c’ is properly used to talk
about; its boundaries will not be agreed to by all, but theoretical
considerations may help to delineate some of its boundaries. However, in
advancing theses that determine the content of a concept C one is identifying a
range that is both unified and significant in its role in life, and in the intellectual
challenges that it presents. That may well leave out perfectly legitimate uses of
‘c’, and as the basis for leaving them out is judgement about importance or
significance, practical and theoretical, the matter may well be controversial.
Many putative counter-examples are not successful in undermining the account
of the concept, but they underline the need for a good case for the disputed
views that lead to their exclusion.
Let me again illustrate the point by drawing on my concern with the intentional
creation of reasons: Promises, I argued, are obligations created by the
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promisor by communicating an intention to create them by that very act of
communication. Not all promises are like that. If Anne tells Bob: ‘the next time
you do that I’ll break your bones’, she does not undertake an obligation to do
so. Some promises are not undertaken obligations, but threats. But that does
not invalidate my account of promising. It is not about the meaning of
‘promises’, it does not deny that one can use ‘promise’ to threaten. It focuses
on a different range of uses of the term, which arguably are more important
and more puzzling.
Finally, it is crucial that theses about a concept are part of (an incomplete)
attempt to analyse and map the generality of concepts that are important in
normative reflection on any matter. Part of the case for theses about a single
concept is that they clarify its relations to other concepts, thus contributing to
generating such a map. That imposes constraints on the theses and the case for
them, constraints that strengthen them. One such constraint is in the
interdependence of apparently distinct theses. Whether the service conception
does justice to practical authority depends, e.g., on whether my account of
what makes a life go well for the person whose life it is is along the right lines.
Failure in one area may undermine success in another. On the other hand,
mistaken assumptions about one concept may undermine a criticism of theses
regarding another concept. Burra’s paper repeatedly draws attention to the
fact that putative counter-examples are not necessarily successful counterexamples. He also brings out another phenomenon that is even clearer in
Pallikkathayil’s paper. The inter-dependence of the accounts of different
concepts may make one feel, when thinking of one of them, that the account,
even though true, falls short of providing enough information or did not offer
the right explanation. Typical were responses to the service account by those
complaining that they still do not know who has legitimate authority. It seems
to me likely that some of the critics of my account of rights, as well as suffering
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(as Pallikkathayil points out) from incomplete reading of the account, also felt
that something is missing. In a way they are right, there is much that is missing.
What is probably not missing is an account that identifies rights and connects
them to other normative concepts: what is good for a person, duties,
justification. A good example is Pallikkathayil’s criticism of my account of
parental rights:
‘A parent may, for example, have a right against others’ interference
with her parenting choices (at least for a certain range of choices).
What explains this right? I am tempted to think that it is explained
by the duty parents have to raise their children, a duty they can only
successfully satisfy without such interference. Now, as I have just
pointed out, it is entirely plausible that parents’[sic] have an interest
in being able to satisfy their parental duties. So, I am not claiming
that Raz’s account has no explanation of this parental right. Instead,
I am claiming that it is the wrong explanation. The right protects
parents’ ability to fulfill their duties. Describing the right as instead
responsive to the interest parents have in fulfilling their duties
unnecessarily obscures the object and purpose of the right.’
The difference between our views is not great. It is not that I give a different
explanation of or ground for parental rights. Rather, I contend for an additional
step in the argument that explains their existence: Parental duties establish an
interest in being able to discharge them that is the ground of a right parents
have to the means that facilitate discharging the duties (a duly qualified right)
and that gives Jamie’s parents the derivative right (for example) to tell Miki’s
parents not to expose Jamie to some dangerous chemicals.
Is the extra step needed? Is it ever mentioned or in the thought of parents
when discussing such rights? Of course it is: ‘I must be able to do what I have a
duty to do’, ‘I cannot be left with a duty that I am unable to fulfil’, and similarly
phrased thoughts are in their mind whenever there is a doubt about their
rights. They manifest the thought that they are personally wronged if denied a
way to discharge their duty. It is worth remembering here that while parental
duties are a burden, they, like duties generally, are not only a burden. They
13

indicate that the parents have responsibilities and are entrusted with tasks that
they are proud to have, that sometimes they have children partly in order to
have those tasks. Their standing in their own eyes and in the eyes of others is
affected by their attitudes to those duties and responsibilities. They have a
powerful interest in being able to do well in fulfilling these responsibilities. One
need not disagree with Pallikkathayil that sometimes focussing on that side of
the picture may divert attention from the other side – the connection between
the rights to the duties towards the children and the welfare of the children.
But the fact that sometimes it is best not to mention the parental interest does
not mean that it does not play a role in justifying the right.
I suspect that many of the criticisms of my account of rights, though not all,
derive from a blinkered view of what rights are, much of it inspired by a
Kantian sentiment, leading to an exaggerated view of rights. Many rights are
pretty ordinary, mundane affairs, like a right to cut off branches overhanging
my land, and many are held by corporations and other entities that have
nothing like the dignity or worth that humans are supposed to have, and they
do not all derive from some important rights related to human dignity or the
like. Many rights derive from duties, functions, purposes, like the rights of
public bodies (which are subject to conditions and qualifications) to take
actions necessary for the discharge of their duties or the pursuit of the
purposes they were entrusted with. What some critics have in mind are
features that belong with some classes of rights and are not shared by all
classes, not being essential features of rights.
Given all these points, is there a case to describe theses and arguments of this
kind as offering conceptual analysis? Yes and No. The more straightforward the
argument for an account is, the stronger the case for regarding it as an account
of an existing concept. For there is a strong argument to say that the account
brings to light a distinction that people generally, or a significant sub-
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population, actually deploy, and that plays a role of some importance in their
thinking. The more complex the argument for an account the more it relies on
disputed views, and the weaker is the case for regarding it as no more than an
explanation of an existing concept. However, if it is a sound argument it has a
claim to be a reforming or a creative case for a concept, albeit not one widely
recognised. Either way, even when the account does little more than elucidate
a generally used concept, the case for the account does not rely on it being an
explanation of an existing concept.
So far I have not mentioned Jonathan Quong’s comment. It belongs to a
different world. Reading it I sometimes feel that I live, or think I do, in a
different world from the one he inhabits. Or perhaps, that he believes that
people regularly have emotions and attitudes that I think are had only
occasionally. In thinking about his comment I avoid using the terms ‘liberalism’
‘perfectionism’ and ‘anti-perfectionism’. Even though his comment pivots on
them, I think (for reasons sketched earlier) that no content is lost, and some
clarity is gained by avoiding them.
What exercises Quong is the possibility of some people having to live and act
under rules that they disagree with. He introduces us to that possibility by
telling us of a philosophy department in which ‘some faculty members must
subordinate their convictions about the nature of philosophy to the
justification of the department’s rules, but others will not have to do so’
(because they agree with the rules). So phrased you may think that he is not so
much exercised by people having to ‘subordinate their convictions’ and apply
rules they disagree with, as by the fact that only some have to do so. However,
Quong’s worries are unlikely to be put to rest if all members of the
department have to ‘subordinate their convictions’ in that way, for example, if
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they cannot change rules that were laid down in long forgotten times.5 I should
make it clear that Quong’s comment is an argument that we have a strong
reason (I am not sure how strong he thinks it is) to avoid such subordination
in some cases only. But there is something in his terminology that suggests a
sentiment that finds subordination of one’s convictions undesirable in itself. I
find the need to live under rules one disagrees with to be a precondition of any
social life in the contemporary world, and thus while not necessarily something
to be desired for its own sake, at least something which the capacity to adjust
to is highly praiseworthy.
I am yet to identify any philosophical disagreement with Quong. 6 I do not find
it easy to do, mainly because so much appears to turn on factual
disagreements. For example, he introduces his argument with the following
factual observations:
Disagreements about ideals are widespread and sharp. They
threaten to make mutually advantageous forms of cooperative life
difficult or even impossible. Appropriate political institutions and rules
can be at least a partial solution to this problem by serving as an
impartial framework to resolve certain disputes.
Agreed. And it has to be added that some societies are led to internal conflicts
that make their continued existence undesirable. Partition or some other
transformation of their identity may be the only reasonable escape from their
plight. Interestingly, in some cases when partitions do occur the differences in

Quong explicitly denies that equality plays no role in his argument. He claims to have an
intuition that the case in which everyone is subjecting their judgement is better (at least in one
respect) than the case he describes, because there is no inequality. By now the reader would know
that I have no such intuition and would have regarded it as false had I had it. Still, it is true that
Quong’s argument invokes an equality concern; that is how it is presented: ‘But in the version of the
department we have been imagining, the department’s rules and institutions are designed in a way
that does not offer anything like the equal protection of this interest for its members. Some
members will have this interest perfectly protected, whereas this interest for other members of the
department is entirely thwarted.’ He invokes equality, but he invokes it in defence of – what I will
claim – is a non-existing interest. As I argued in the book: if one starts with false principles it may be
that they entice one towards some equality principles.
6
He has an intuition that I do not have, but that is hardly a philosophical disagreement.
5
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ideals between the two new countries (when ideals are understood to exclude
the desire to separate and be independent, and closely related aspirations) are
much smaller than the divisions inside the two resulting countries. All manner
of historical memories, physical and economic circumstances, emotional
reactions and symbolic associations are most powerful in keeping societies
together, as well as in driving them apart. That is consistent with differences in
ideals having an impact. What is worrying is not concern about ways to
ameliorate the damage such differences may make, but the exaggeration of the
role such differences sometimes play in social life, to the extent of appearing to
exclude all other factors.
Suppose we face countries, like the US, whose people strongly prefer to keep
together, whose identity is sustained by a powerful sentiment of national pride,
perhaps made possible by a distorted view of their history. How should they
confront their disagreements about ideals? One is inclined to say that anything,
which is not morally objectionable, may help them. It may be pride in their
sporting achievements, pride in their military might, which is the fear and envy
of the world (though whether this is morally acceptable may be questionable).
It may be the prospect of economic improvement to oneself and one’s
offspring, which overshadows any religious reservations about the character of
one’s society, or it may be a realisation that raising certain issues, however
fundamental they are among one’s ideals, would cause aggravation and strife
without doing any good. It is significant that in western societies most people
are aware that their most basic and cherished ideals are not realised and are
unlikely to be realised in their lifetime or any time soon afterwards. They, for
the most part, without much awareness of the fact, reconcile themselves with
how thing are, because of what has been achieved in their country and for
themselves, and try to improve conditions, within the range of the possible.
Differences, including the deepest differences and disappointment about failure
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to realise their ideals, are often dormant, if only for lack of a rational way to
make progress with their realisation. Repressive societies are those that block
all or most important avenues for amelioration, not those – which include all
of them – in which full realisation is impossible. It is true that even in nonrepressive societies waves of insistence on full realisation of some ideals, best
known to us as waves of radicalisation and extremism, do occur, sometimes
incited by self-interested bodies, sometimes for more complex causes. They do
face governments, however enlightened, with very hard choices. What is clear
is that the solution is not to give way, and that change in the principles
governing the public domain plays only a limited, though sometimes vital, part
in overcoming such waves.
Quong may be aware of all this. But he is disturbed by the fact that when social
peace and a modicum of social harmony is attained in such ways it still involves
some people accommodating themselves to being subject to rules they
disagree with. And it does indeed involve that. Two aspects of contemporary
life are relevant here. First, most people who live under rules that they
disagree with and most of the people who, regarding some such rules, deeply
mind that fact, disagree mostly not with the rules by which decisions are
socially or legally taken, but with some of the results of the use of these rules,
that is some of the rules that were decided upon in accordance with rules
about how to take decisions that they do agree with. Second, even though they
all regret that they live under rules that they think are wrong or unjust, etc.
what they regret is being wronged or being subjected to injustice. Compared
with that the fact that they personally disagree with the rules is relatively
insignificant. Moreover, they have an interest not to live under those rules only
if they really are wronged by them or subjected to injustice through them.
They all, if rational, implicitly or explicitly acknowledge that if they are
mistaken, and if the rules are justified, and worse still, if repealing them would
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wrong either themselves or others or would be unjust either to themselves or
to others, then it is a good thing that they are subjected to these rules even
though they are of the (mistaken) opinion that the rules are bad or wrong.7
Therefore, people do not think that an arbiter is partial just because he has
reached a decision which favours one side in a dispute over the other. They
know that the impartial arbiter is the unbiased one, and that in many disputes
one side is right and the other not, so that his task is to find for the one who is
in the right. There is much more to discuss: what of disputes where there is no
right or wrong, or where each side is partly right, or where there are many
dimensions to the disputes, or where humane concerns arise because one side
is so often in the wrong that its self-respect is undermined etc. But they take
us beyond the current discussion.
Does Quong’s paper disclose any philosophical disagreement? I am still not
clear. The disagreement about what constitutes impartiality may well turn out
to be terminological, though behind that there may be a philosophical
disagreement of an unidentified content. The disagreement about what
interests people have is at least half factual, though it may also be philosophical
with moral implications.

Yes, I am claiming that Quong has not identified an interest that people have in not
subordinating their judgement. There are, of course, in cases like that of the philosophy department,
real human interests. I have ignored them because Quong does. But it is not only about what is
philosophy and what is rubbish. It is also a matter of the livelihood, respect and life prospects of
people who sincerely believed that their brand of alchemy will produce gold. They do not have the
right to practise alchemy just because otherwise they will have to practise chemistry. But their
genuine needs should not be ignored. I changed from philosophy and pretend philosophy to
chemistry and alchemy because Quong presents the dispute as if it is of this character. It rarely is
that kind of dispute in philosophical departments, but it came close to that in countries in which for
dozens of year the only philosophy permitted to be taught was Marxism and variants or derivatives
of it. When that period ended, the sitting professors found themselves in something similar to a
Quongian dilemma. If they were not fired they were required to teach Hume and other
philosophical writings which they did not want and were not qualified to do. That was no reason to
deny their university the teaching of the great philosophers. But it presented the human dilemma
that I mentioned.
7
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